THE CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY I 137

In Which Alaric and the Visigoths Ravage Greece

9-7. In Which Alaric and the Visigoths Ravage Greece

Meanwhile the Visigoths had broken loose from Moesia. Those of their tribesmen who had formerly accompanied Alaric to Transylvania had joined them and chosen Alaric, whose power at that time, however, was still limited, as leader in the coming war. This war was fraught with danger for the Eastern Empire, for it appears that in the early spring of 395 the whole mass of the Visigoths marched south towards Constantinople. As before, there could of course be no question of capturing the city, but the surrounding country was mercilessly devastated. It is most probable that Rufinus, who paid repeated visits to the hostile camp, bribed the enemy to retire. Alaric now made his way along the coast to Macedonia and Thessaly. Near Larissa he encountered Stilicho, who had left Italy with strong forces. These were the victorious East-Roman soldiers, whom he was leading home to their own country, hoping at the same time to win back Illyria for the Western Empire.

This province, though given to Theodosius by Gratian, was said to have been restored by the former a short time before his death. Apparently the Goths had first of all tried to gain the valley of the Peneus, the Vale of Tempe; but meeting with resistance, they had pushed on across the eastern slopes of Olympus into Thessaly, where they barricaded themselves behind their wagons. Stilicho was on the point of attacking them when he received a message from Arcadius, ordering him to dismiss the army of the Eastern Empire, and himself return to Italy. If at first sight this order seems strange, it is because we have long been accustomed to see in Stilicho a disinterested statesman and general, who dedicated his labour and personality to the family of Theodosius. This disposition of Eastern Illyria, which Theodosius was supposed to have made shortly before his death, is however very doubtful, and it is certain that Stilieho had entertained personal ambitions with regard to that province. Viewed in the light of these circumstances, the order from Arcadius appears in a very different light, especially if to this is added the fact that in the same year the Huns had broken through the gates of the Caucasus at Baku on the Caspian Sea and reached Syria by way of Armenia. There they laid siege to Antioch and proceeded thence to Asia Minor. Ravages of every kind marked their way.

In this situation it was an absolute necessity for the welfare of the State that the army should return to its own country. Stilicho obeyed the order, because, as has justly been remarked, he was probably uncertain about the future conduct of the East-Roman troops, a section of whom remained in Greece under Gerontius's command to cover Thermopylae. Alaric, however, assisted perhaps by treachery, took possession of this famous pass without difficulty. After this the Goths marched through Boeotia into Attica. Here Alaric succeeded in seizing the Piraeus, and forced Athens to capitulate by cutting off her supplies. It is probable that she escaped pillage by the payment of a sum of money; Alaric stayed for a short time peacefully within her walls. From Athens the march of the Goths was continued to Eleusis, where they ransacked the temple of Demeter, and further to Megara, which was quickly taken. Gerontius had left the entrance to the Peloponnesus undefended, and the Gothic hordes, meeting with no resistance, broke like a torrent upon Corinth and thence on Argos and Sparta. Many an ancient work of art must have perished in this rush, but no mention is made of any systematic and wilful destruction of the ancient monuments.

It is a curious fact, that after all this the East-Roman government seems neither to have made war against the Huns, who had invaded Asia, nor to have lent assistance to the Greeks, when Gerontius had so utterly failed to do his duty at Thermopylae and the Isthmus. Help came rather from another quarter, and primarily, it must be owned, with a different purpose in view. Though Stilieho had returned to Italy, he had been kept well informed about events in Greece. As he himself had designs on East Illyria, to which Epirus and Achaia belonged, and as Alaric was to all appearances endeavouring to create an independent sovereignty in these provinces, it was imperative for the vicegerent of the West to interfere. In 397 he transported an army to Greece, and, landing on the south side of Corinth, expelled the Goths from Arcadia and surrounded them at Elis near the Alpheus on the plateau of Pholoe. But no decisive battle was fought, for Stilicho was not sufficiently master of his own troops, and just then the revolt of the Moorish prince Gildo threatened to become a serious danger to the Western Empire. Gildo had formerly been praefect of Mauretania and had subsequently been raised to the office of magister utriusque militiae.

In the year 394 Gildo began his revolt, whereby he intended to secure the North coast of Africa as a dominion of his own, and in 397 he offered Africa as a feudal province to the Eastern Empire, hoping thereby to kindle war between the two Empires. In this predicament Stilicho avoided a decisive encounter with the Goths. For the second time he allowed his adversary to escape. He even concluded a treaty with Alaric, which doubtless contained an alliance against the Eastern Empire; for in these precarious circumstances the chief of the brave Goths might possibly prove of great service to Stilicho in his ambitious private policy. The effect of these conditions on the mutual relations of the two Empires was soon apparent. At Constantinople Stilicho was declared an enemy of the State, whilst in the Western Empire the consulship of Eutropius, who had been nominated for 399 and had entirely won the favour of Arcadius, was not acknowledged. Before his death Theodosius had so arranged the division of the Empire that the cohesion of the whole might for the future be firmly and permanently secured. Thus the first deep cleft had been made in a union which was already difficult to maintain. Neither Empire had a permanent diplomatic representation; only special embassies were sent from time to time, so that unfounded suspicions were very likely to arise on either side.

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