1.23. What is Natural is Pleasant
Friends belong to the class of pleasant things; it is pleasant to love—if you love wine, you certainly find it delightful—and it is pleasant to be loved, for this too makes a man see himself as the possessor of goodness, a thing that every being that has a feeling for it desires to possess. To be loved means to be valued for one’s own personal qualities. To be admired is also pleasant, simply because of the honour implied. Flattery and flatterers are pleasant: the flatterer is a man who, you believe, admires and likes.
To do the same thing often is pleasant, since, as we saw, anything habitual is pleasant. And to change is also pleasant, for change means an approach to nature, whereas invariable repetition of anything causes the excessive prolongation of a settled condition. Therefore, says the poet, “Change is in all things sweet.” That is why what comes to us only at long intervals is pleasant, whether it be a person or a thing, for it is a change from what we had before, and, besides, what comes only at long intervals has the value of rarity.
Learning things and wondering at things are also pleasant as a rule; wondering implies the desire of learning, so that the object of wonder is an object of desire; while in learning one is brought into one’s natural condition.
Conferring and receiving benefits belong to the class of pleasant things; to receive a benefit is to get what one desires; to confer a benefit implies both posses sion and superiority, both of which are things we try to attain. It is because beneficent acts are pleasant that people find it pleasant to put their neighbours straight again and to supply what they lack.
Again, since learning and wondering are pleasant, it follows that such things as acts of imitation must be pleasant—for instance, painting, sculpture, poetry and every product of skilful imitation. This latter is true even if the object imitated is not itself pleasant, for it is not the object itself which here gives delight; the spectator draws inferences (“That is a so-and-so”) and thus learns something fresh. Dramatic turns of fortune and hairbreadth escapes from perils are pleasant, because we feel all such things are wonderful.
And since what is natural is pleasant, and things akin to each other seem natural to each other, therefore all kindred and similar things are usually pleasant to each other. For instance, one man, horse, or young person is pleasant to another man, horse, or young person. Hence the proverbs “mate delights mate”, “like to like”, “beast knows beast”, “jackdaw to jackdaw”, and the rest of them. But since everything like and akin to oneself is pleasant, and since every man is himself more like and akin to himself than any one else is, it follows that all of us must be more or less fond of ourselves. For all this resemblance and kinship is present particularly in the relation of an individual to himself. And because we are all fond of ourselves, it follows that what is our own is pleasant to all of us, as for instance our own deeds and words. That is why we are usually fond of our flatterers, our lovers, and honour; also of our children, for our children are our own work.
It is also pleasant to complete what is defective, for the whole thing thereupon becomes our own work. And since power over others is very pleasant, it is pleasant to be thought wise, for practical wisdom secures us power over others. (Scientific wisdom is also pleasant, because it is the knowledge of many wonderful things.) Again, since most of us are ambitious, it must be pleasant to disparage our neighbours as well as to have power over them.
It is pleasant for a man to spend his time over what he feels he can do best; just as the poet says:
To that he bends himself,
To that each day allots most time, wherein
He is indeed the best part of himself.
Similarly, since amusement and every kind of relaxation and laughter too belong to the class of pleasant things, it follows that ludicrous things are pleasant, whether men, words, or deeds. We have discussed the ludicrous separately in the treatise on the Art of Poetry.
So much for the subject of pleasant things. By considering their opposites we can easily see what things are unpleasant.
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