6. Tales of Secret Service (2)
A Letter from the King of Spain
Next morning the Baron and the soi-disant son of Ferdinand’s private secretary presented themselves at the Foreign Office, and were received in a long audience by Mr. Canning. No doubt whatever appears to have been felt about their being what they represented themselves to be. The Baron was a man of the world, who spoke easy and polite French, and showed a complete knowledge of the politics of Spain and France during the present generation. His companion was a good-looking, brisk young man, of great self-confidence, and was a quick master of replies. They explained their mission to Canning, and he was ready to discuss it at length.
The letter addressed to the British Foreign Minister turned out, when opened, not to be signed by King Ferdinand himself, but by his brother Prince Carlos, who was his fellow-prisoner, the Prince’s private seal was appended, and the document was countersigned by the Marquis of Guadalcázar. It commended to the minister the bearer, the Baron de Agra, “our friend and confidant”, and begged that he might be aided to transmit to the Viceroy of Mexico certain documents of primary importance contained in a sealed dispatch-box, which the Baron showed. These documents were said to be directions to the Viceroy to make sure of the crown of Mexico for his master, even in case of the loss of Spain. Don Carlos added that he had not been able to get his brother to write in his own hand, because “certain timid advisers” had warned His Majesty of the danger which would accrue if he was found corresponding directly with England. It was suggested that the British Foreign Secretary might send a covering letter along with the dispatches for Mexico, to the effect that they had come to him from trustworthy hands, and that it was to be desired that the contents should receive immediate attention.
Spanish archivists, skilled in the habitual language of state documents of the early XIXth century, say that the phraseology of the dispatch to Canning was such as no Spanish prince of that time would have used, and that the signature at the end was not in the proper form employed by junior members of the Royal Family. But this could hardly have been known to Canning, and for a reason which seemed to him sufficient he refrained from exhibiting the letter to any of the Spaniards then in London, who might have been struck by these abnormalities.
For though the Minister seems to have had no doubt concerning the genuineness of the document, or the good faith of its bearer, there was an obstacle which prevented him from carrying out the Baron’s request, and sending him, or his companions, or all of them, to Mexico without delay. Canning had scruples about acting on behalf of an imprisoned King, of whose character and intentions he was doubtful, when a central national government was just about to be formed in Spain. He thought that Great Britain ought not to interfere in the affairs of Spanish America without the knowledge and approval of the Spanish Home Government. The captive King might be sending orders which would clash with those of the “Supreme Central Junta”, which was due ere long to meet, and to assume responsibility for the whole Spanish empire on the other side of the Atlantic. Affairs in the Peninsula had been moving very fast during the recent month, and he was being kept in constant touch with them by British vessels carrying the news almost from day to day.
Dupont’s army had surrendered on July 20th, the French had evacuated Madrid on August 1st, and the representatives of all the local juntas had agreed to meet at Aranjuez in September. All this was well known to Canning when the Baron presented himself in Whitehall on September 1st. So while listening to all the arguments about the necessity for sending on the dispatches to Mexico, he thought that it would be incorrect to do so without authorization from Spain. Whatever was due to happen in America on the first news of the kidnapping at Bayonne would surely have happened already: for nearly four months had elapsed since that tragedy: and another month would have to be added (perhaps more) to allow of Agra’s packet reaching Vera Cruz. A Spanish ambassador would soon appear in London, and the whole affair ought to be placed before him. As a matter of fact such a personage was forthcoming only in October, when the Central Junta appointed Admiral Apodaca Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of St. James. The Admiral was already on the spot, having been one of the deputies sent to ask British aid by the Junta of Andalusia in July.
Meanwhile Canning, all through September, continued to receive visits from the Baron, and to confer with him about the help which England was giving Spain, and the possibilities—good and evil—of what might happen (or rather might have happened) in America. On October 1st the Baron presented, with much diffidence and expressions of troubled self-esteem, a note in which he said that although his master had forbidden him to make any monetary demands on the British Government, he had not been actually forbidden to take any assistance offered him. And he enclosed a letter of exchange drawn on the Viceroy of Mexico for 4,000 dollars, to be paid through a banker, Don Firmin Tarlet. Canning, without the least hesitation, sent him the £800 which such a bill represented, and asked him to wait a little longer.
To obtain a deluxe leatherbound edition of STUDIES ON THE NAPOLEONIC WARS, subscribe to Castalia History.